We demonstrate that, ignoring computational constraints, it is possible to release privacy-preserving databases that are useful for all queries over a discretized domain from any given concept class with polynomial VC-dimension. We show a new lower bound for releasing databases that are useful for halfspace queries over a continuous domain. Despite this, we give a privacy-preserving polynomial time algorithm that releases information useful for all halfspace queries, for a slightly relaxed definition of usefulness. Inspired by learning theory, we introduce a new notion of data privacy, which we call distributional privacy, and show that it is strictly stronger than the prevailing privacy notion, differential privacy.
INTRODUCTION
As large-scale collection of personal information becomes easier, the problem of database privacy is increasingly important. In many cases, we might hope to learn useful information from sensitive data (for example, we might learn a correlation between smoking and lung cancer from a collection of medical records). However, for legal, financial, or moral reasons, administrators of sensitive datasets might not want to release their data. If those with the * Supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CCF-0514922. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. expertise to learn from large datasets are not the same as those who administer the datasets, what is to be done? In order to study this problem theoretically, it is important to quantify what exactly we mean by "privacy."
A series of recent papers [11, 9, 16] formalizes the notion of differential privacy. A database privatization mechanism (which may be either interactive or non-interactive) satisfies differential privacy if the addition or removal of a single database element does not change the probability of any outcome of the privatization mechanism by more than some small amount. The definition is intended to capture the notion that "distributional information is not private"-we may reveal that smoking correlates to lung cancer, but not that any individual has lung cancer. Individuals may submit their personal information to the database secure in the knowledge that (almost) nothing can be discovered from the database with their information that could not have been discovered without their information.
There has been a series of lower bound results [6, 9, 10] that suggests that non-interactive databases (or interactive databases that can be queried a linear number of times) cannot accurately answer all queries, or an adversary will be able to reconstruct all but a 1 − o(1) fraction of the original database exactly (obviously a very strong violation of privacy). As a result, most recent work has focused on the design of interactive mechanisms that answer only a sublinear number of queries. However, since these mechanisms may only answer a sublinear number of queries in total (not per user), after which point they must be destroyed, this limits their practicality in situations where the number of queries that might be asked is comparable to or larger than the number of entries in the database.
In this paper, motivated by learning theory, we propose the study of privacy-preserving mechanisms that are useful for all queries in a particular class (such as all conjunctive queries or all halfspace queries). In particular, we focus on predicate queries of the form, "what fraction of the database entries satisfy predicate ϕ?" and say that a sanitized output is useful for a class C if the answers to all queries in C have changed by at most some ± . In doing so, we circumvent existing lower bounds for non-interactive databases that only hold for particular types of queries, such as subset sum queries [6, 9, 10] . Building on the techniques of Kasiviswanathan et al. [14] , we show that for discretized domains, for any concept class with polynomial VC-dimension, it is possible to release differential-privacy-preserving databases that are simultaneously useful for all queries in the concept class. The algorithm may not be computationally efficient in general, though we do have a computationally efficient method for range queries over a finite interval with bounded precision.
Unfortunately, we show that for non-discretized domains, under the above definition of usefulness, it is impossible to publish a differentially private non-interactive database that is useful for even quite simple classes such as interval queries. We next show how, under a natural relaxation of the usefulness criterion, one can release information that can be used to usefully answer (arbitrarily many) halfspace queries while satisfying privacy. In particular, instead of requiring that useful mechanisms answer each query approximately correctly, we allow our algorithm to produce an answer that is approximately correct for some nearby query. This relaxation is motivated by the notion of large-margin separators in learning theory [1, 19, 18] ; in particular, queries with no data points close to the separating hyperplane must be answered accurately, and the allowable error more generally is a function of the fraction of points close to the hyperplane.
We also introduce a new concept, distributional privacy, which makes explicit the notion that when run on a database drawn from a distribution, privacy-preserving mechanisms should reveal only information about the underlying distribution, and nothing else. Given a distribution D over database points, a database privatization mechanism satisfies distributional privacy if with high probability, drawing an entirely new database from D does not change the probability of any outcome of the privatization mechanism by more than some small amount. We show that distributional privacy is a strictly stronger guarantee than differential privacy by showing that any mechanism that satisfies distributional privacy also satisfies differential privacy, but that there are some functions that can be answered accurately while satisfying differential privacy, and yet reveal information about the particular database (although not about any particular database element) that is not "distributional."
We also show, in Appendix A, a small separation between interactive and non-interactive privacy-preserving mechanisms for predicate queries.
Related Work
Recent work on theoretical guarantees for data privacy was initiated by [6] . The notion of differential privacy, developed in a series of papers [4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 15, 3, 17] , separates issues of privacy from issues of outside information by defining privacy as indistinguishability of neighboring databases. This captures the notion that (nearly) anything that can be learned if your data is included in the database can also be learned without your data. This notion of privacy ensures that users have very little incentive to withhold their information from the database. The connection between data privacy and incentive-compatibility was recently formalized by McSherry and Talwar [15] .
Prior work on interactive mechanisms has implied a number of impossibility results for non-interactive mechanisms. Dinur and Nissim [6] show that if a database answers all subset sum with less than o( √ n) noise, this would allow an adversary to reconstruct a 1 − o(1) fraction of the database. Dwork et al. [10] show that even if the privacy-preserving mechanism is allowed to answer a small constant fraction of queries arbitrarily, if the remaining queries still are perturbed with o( √ n) noise, an adversary can still reconstruct the database.
Dwork et al. [9] define a notion called global sensitivity and show that releasing a database perturbed with noise proportional to the global sensitivity of the query functions can preserve privacy, with the caveat that such mechanisms can only answer a sublinear number of queries in total, and then no further information about the database can ever be released. Blum et al. [4] consider a model of learning and show that concept classes that are learnable in the statistical query (SQ) model are also learnable from a polynomially sized dataset accessed through an interactive differential-privacypreserving mechanism. We note that such mechanisms still may only answer a fixed number of queries in total.
Most similar to this paper is the recent work of Kasiviswanathan et al. [14] . Kasiviswanathan et al. study what can be learned privately when what is desired is that the hypothesis output by the learning algorithm satisfies differential privacy. They show that in a PAC learning model in which the learner has access to the private database, ignoring computational constraints, anything that is PAC learnable is also privately PAC learnable. We build upon the technique in their paper to show that in fact, it is possible to privately release a dataset that is simultaneously useful for any function in a concept class of polynomial VC-dimension. This resolves an open question posed by [14] about whether a VC-dimension analogue of Occam's razor holds in their private learning model. Kasiviswanathan et al. also study several restrictions on learning algorithms, show separation between these learning models, and give efficient algorithms for learning particular concept classes.
In this work, we study non-interactive database release mechanisms, which may be used to answer an unlimited number of queries. We circumvent the existing lower bounds by only guaranteeing usefulness for queries in restricted classes. Blum et al. [4] consider running machine learning algorithms on datasets that are accessed through interactive privacy-preserving mechanisms. In contrast, we show how to release data sets from which one can usefully learn the values of all functions in restricted concept classes.
Motivation from Learning Theory
From a machine learning perspective, one of the main reasons one would want to perform statistical analysis of a database in the first place is to gain information about the population from which that database was drawn. In particular, a fundamental result in learning theory is that if one views a database as a collection of random draws from some distribution D, and one is interested in a particular class C of boolean predicates over examples, then a database D of sizeÕ(VCDIM(C)/ 2 ) is sufficient so that with high probability, for every query q ∈ C, the proportion of examples in D satisfying q is within ± of the true probability mass under D [1, 19] . 1 Our main result can be viewed as asking how much larger does a database D have to be in order to do this in a privacy-preserving manner: that is, to allow one to (probabilistically) construct an outputD that accurately approximates D with respect to all queries in C, and yet that reveals no extra information about database D. 2 In fact, our notion of distributional privacy (Section 7) is motivated by this view. Note that since interactive privacy mechanisms can handle arbitrary queries of this form so long as only o(n) are requested, our objective is interesting only for classes C that contain Ω(n), or even exponentially in n many queries. We will indeed achieve this (Theorem 3.1), since |C| ≥ 2 VCDIM(C) .
Organization
We present essential definitions in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that, ignoring computational constraints, one can release sanitized databases over discretized domains that are useful for any concept class with polynomial VC-dimension. We then, in Section 4, give an efficient algorithm for privately releasing a database useful for the class of interval queries. We next turn to the study of halfspace queries over R d and show in Section 5 that, without relaxing the definition of usefulness, one cannot release a database that is privacy-preserving and useful for halfspace queries over a continuous domain. Relaxing our definition of usefulness, in Section 6, we give an algorithm that in polynomial time, creates a sanitized database that usefully and privately answers all halfspace queries. We present an alternative definition of privacy and discuss its relationship to differential privacy in Section 7. In Appendix A, we give a separation of interactive and non-interactive databases for predicate queries.
DEFINITIONS
For a database D, let A be a database access mechanism. For an interactive mechanism, we will say that A(D, Q) induces a distribution over outputs for each query Q. For a non-interactive mechanism, we will say that A(D) induces a distribution over outputs.
We say that an interactive database access mechanism A satisfies α-differential privacy if for all neighboring databases D1 and D2 (differing in only a single element), for all queries Q, and for all outputs x,
We say that a non-interactive database sanitization mechanism A satisfies α-differential privacy if for all neighboring databases D1 and D2, and for all sanitized outputs b D,
In Section 7, we propose an alternate definition of privacy, distributional privacy, and show that it is strictly stronger than differential privacy. For simplicity, however, in the main body of the paper, we use the standard definition, differential privacy. All of these proofs can be adapted to the distributional privacy notion.
DEFINITION 2.1. The global sensitivity of a query f is its maximum difference when evaluated on two neighboring databases:
In this paper, we consider the private release of information useful for classes of predicate queries.
DEFINITION 2.2. A predicate query Qϕ for any predicate ϕ is defined to be
Previous work shows how one can construct database access mechanisms that can answer any low-sensitivity query while preserving differential privacy:
DEFINITION 2.4. Let the interactive mechanism PRIVATEα(D, Q) respond to queries Q by returning Q(D) + Z where Z is a random variable drawn from the Laplace distribution:
However, lower bounds of Dinur and Nissim [6] and Dwork et al. [9] imply that such mechanisms can only answer a sublinear number of queries on any database. Note that these mechanisms can only answer a sublinear number of queries in total, not per user.
We propose to construct database access mechanisms whose results can be released to the public, and so can necessarily be used to answer an arbitrarily large number of queries. We seek to do this while simultaneously preserving privacy. However, in order to circumvent the lower bounds of Dinur and Nissim [6] and Dwork et al. [9] , we cannot hope to be able to usefully answer arbitrary queries. We instead seek to answer restricted classes of queries while preserving "usefulness," which we define as follows:
GENERAL RELEASE MECHANISM
In this section we show that (ignoring computational considerations) it is possible to release a non-interactive database useful for any concept class with polynomial VC-dimension, while preserving α-differential privacy, given an initial database of polynomial size. Our use of the exponential mechanism is inspired by its use by Kasiviswanathan et al. [14] .
THEOREM 3.1. For any class of functions C, and any database
Note that the algorithm is not necessarily efficient.
We give an (inefficient) algorithm that outputs a sanitized database
We note that the size of the output database is independent of the size of our initial database. This is sufficient for ( , δ)-usefulness because the set of all databases of this size forms an -cover with respect to C of the set of all possible databases.
LEMMA 3.2 ([1, 19]). Given any database
PROOF. This follows from standard sample complexity bounds.
McSherry and Talwar [15] define the exponential mechanism as follows: 
THEOREM 3.4 ([15]). The exponential mechanism preserves (αnGSq)-differential privacy.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. We use the exponential mechanism and define our quality function q to be:
Note that GSq = 1/n. In order to show that this mechanism satisfies ( , δ) 
, and therefore that such a database is output with probability at least proportional to e −α n/4 . Let A be the event that the exponential mechanism outputs some database b
Let B be the event that the exponential mechanism outputs some database b
Setting this quantity to be at least 1/δ > (1 − δ)/δ, we see that it is sufficient to take
This result extends in a straightforward manner to the case of any discretized database domain, not just a boolean space. ) is sufficient in order to output a set of points that is -useful for a concept class C, while simultaneously preserving α-differential privacy. If we were to view our database as having been drawn from some distribution D, this is only an extra e O(
factor larger than what would be required to achieve -usefulness with respect to D, even without any privacy guarantee! In fact, as we will show in Theorem A.6, it is impossible to release a database that is o(1/ √ n)-useful for the class of parity functions while preserving privacy, and so a dependence on of at least Ω(1/ 2 ) is necessary. The results in this section only apply for discretized database domains, and may not be computationally efficient. We explore these two issues further in the remaining sections of the paper.
INTERVAL QUERIES
In this section we give an efficient algorithm for privately releasing a database useful for the class of interval queries over a discretized domain, given a database of size only polynomial in our privacy and usefulness parameters. We note that our algorithm is easily extended to the class of axis-aligned rectangles in d dimensional space for d a constant; we present the case of d = 1 for clarity.
Consider a database D of n points in [0, 1] in which the entries are discretized to b bits of precision; our bounds will be polynomial in b (in Corollary 5.2 we show some discretization is necessary). Given a1 ≤ a2, both in [0, 1], let Ia 1 ,a 2 be the indicator function corresponding to the interval [a1, a2]. That is:
Note that GSQ [a 1 ,a 2 ] = 1/n, and we may answer interval queries while preserving α-differential privacy by adding noise proportional to Lap(1/(αn)).
Given a database D, we will use α -differential privacy preserving interval queries to perform a binary search on the interval [0, 1] and partition it into sub-intervals containing probability mass in the range [ 1/2 − 2, 1/2 + 2]. Because of the discretization, the depth of this search is at most b. We will then output a dataset that has ( 1/2) · n points in each of these intervals. Because we have constructed this dataset using only a small number of privacy preserving queries, its release will also preserve privacy, and it will be ( , δ)-useful for the class of interval queries with an appropriate choice of parameters. Finally, this simple mechanism is clearly computationally efficient. 
We first bound the number of privacy preserving queries our algorithm makes. It finally produces 2/ 1 intervals. Since D is defined over a discretized space, we can identify each interval with the at most b queries on its path through the binary search procedure, and so we will make a total of at most 2b/ 1 = 4b/( ) α -differential privacy preserving queries. Since the differentialprivacy parameter composes, with α = ( α)/4b, our algorithm indeed preserves α differential privacy.
Suppose that the binary search procedure indeed returns intervals each containing probability mass in the range [ 1/2− 2, 1/2+ 2]. Any query will intersect at most two of these intervals only partially. In the worst case, this introduces 1 = /2 error to the query ( 1/2 error from each interval that partially overlaps with the query). Since each query can only overlap at most 2/ 1 intervals, and each interval contains a probability mass that deviates from the true probability mass in D by at most 2, this introduces an additional 2 2/ 1 = /2 error, for a total error rate ≤ . Therefore, to complete the proof, we only need to bound the size of D necessary such that the probability that any of the 2b/ 1 privacy preserving queries returns an answer that deviates from the true answer (in D) by more than 2 is less than δ. Let us call this event FAILURE. Since the event that any single query has error rate ≥ 2 is Pr[Lap(1/(α n)) ≥ 2] ≤ e α 2 n , this follows from a simple union bound:
Solving, we find
We note that although the class of intervals (and more generally, low dimensional axis-aligned rectangles) is a simple class of functions, it nevertheless contains exponentially (in b) many queries, and so it is not feasible to simply ask all possible interval queries using an interactive mechanism.
While it is true that intervals (and low dimensional axis-aligned rectangles) have constant VC-dimension and polynomial -cover size, we can trivially extend the above results to the class of unions of t intervals by dividing by t and answering each interval separately. This class has VC-dimension O(t) and exponentially large -cover size.
LOWER BOUNDS
Could we possibly modify the results of Sections 4 and 3 to hold for non-discretized databases? Suppose we could usefully answer an arbitrary number of queries in some simple concept class C representing interval queries on the real line (for example, "How many points are contained within the following interval?") while still preserving privacy. Then, for any database containing singledimensional real valued points, we would be able to answer median queries with values that fall between the 1/2 − δ, 1/2 + δ percentile of database points by performing a binary search on D using A (where δ = δ( ) is some small constant depending on the usefulness parameter ). However, answering such queries is impossible while guaranteeing differential privacy. Unfortunately, this would seem to rule out usefully answering queries in simple concept classes such as halfspaces and axis-aligned rectangles, that are generalizations of intervals. D are correct to within ± , and so the binary search can proceed. Since = o(n), the result follows.
We may get around the impossibility result of Corollary 5.2 by relaxing our definitions. One approach is to discretize the database domain, as we do in Sections 3 and 4. Another approach, which we take in Section 6, is to relax our definition of usefulness:
DEFINITION 5.3 (USEFULNESS DEFINITION 2). A database mechanism A is ( , δ, γ)-useful for queries in class C according to some metric d if with probability 1 − δ, for every Q ∈ C and every database D, |Q(A(D)) −
Q (D)| ≤ for some Q ∈ C such that d(Q, Q ) ≤ γ.
ANSWERING HALFSPACE QUERIES
Here, we consider databases that contain n elements in R d . In this section, we show how to efficiently release information useful (according to definition 5.3) for the class of halfspace queries for any constant γ > 0. Throughout this section, we assume without loss of generality that the database points are scaled into the unit sphere. Additionally, when we project the points into a lowerdimensional space, we rescale them to the unit sphere. A halfspace query specifies a hyperplane in R d and asks how many points fall above it:
a halfspace query Hy is
The assumption that halfspaces pass through the origin is without loss of generality since we can view translated halfspaces as passing through the origin in a space of dimension d + 1.
In this section, we give an algorithm that is ( , δ, γ)-useful for the class of halfspace queries. For a point x we will writex for the normalization x/||x||2. We define the distance between a point x and a halfspace Hy by d(x, Hy) = |x · y|. For convenience, we define the distance between two halfspaces Hy 1 and Hy 2 to be the sin of the angle between y1 and y2; by a slight abuse of notation, we will denote this by d (y1, y2) . In particular, for a point x and two halfpaces Hy 1 and Hy 2 
) ≤ γ we say that Hy 1 and Hy 2 are γ-close. Given a halfspace Hy 1 , our goal is to output a value v such that |v − Hy 2 (D)| < for some Hy 2 that is γ-close to Hy 1 . Equivalently, we may arbitrarily count or not count any point x ∈ D such that d(x, Hy 1 ) ≤ γ. We note that γ is similar to the notion of margin in machine learning, and that even if Hy 1 and Hy 2 are γ-close, this does not imply that Hy 1 (D) and Hy 2 (D) are close, unless most of the data points are outside a γ margin of Hy 1 and Hy 2 .
We circumvent the halfspace-lower bound of Corollary 5.2 by considering a class of discretized halfspaces:
We first summarize the algorithm, with the parameters to be specified later. Our use of random projections is similar to that in the work of Indyk and Motwani [13] on approximate nearest neighbor queries.
Our algorithm performs m random projections P1, . . . , Pm of the data onto R k . A random projection of n points from R d to R k is defined as follows:
Mi with entries chosen independently and uniformly at random from {−1, 1}. We write the projection of point
For each projected database Pi(D) we ask O(1/γ k−1 ) privacypreserving canonical halfspace queries. To answer a halfspace query Hy, for each projection Pi, we consider H P i (y) and associate with it the answer of the closest canonical halfspace in that projection. Finally, we return the median value of these queries over all m projections. [5, 2] ). Consider a random projection P of a point x and a halfspace Hy onto a random k-dimensional subspace. Then
THEOREM 6.4 (JOHNSON-LINDENSTRAUSS
That is, projecting x and Hy significantly changes the distance between the point and the halfspace with only a small probability.
We choose k such that the probability that projecting a point and a halfspace changes their distance by more than γ/4 is at most 1/4. Solving, this yields
Given a halfspace Hy and a point x, we say that a projection P makes a mistake relative to x and Hy if d(x, Hy) ≥ γ/4, but sign(x · y) = sign(P (x) · P (y)). We have chosen k such that the expected fraction of mistakes relative to any halfspace Hy in any projection P is at most 1/4. By Markov's inequality, therefore, the probability that a projection makes more than 1n mistakes relative to a particular halfspace is at most 1/4.
The probability δ1 that more than m/2 projections make more than 1n mistakes relative to any discretized halfspace is at most 2 bd e −m/12 by a Chernoff bound and a union bound. Solving for m, this gives
For each projection Pi, we select a (3/4)γ-net of halfspaces Ni, such that for every vector y1 ∈ R k corresponding to halfspace Hy 1 , there exists a halfspace Hy 2 ∈ Ni such that d(y1, y2) ≤ (3/4)γ. We note that |Ni| = O(1/γ k−1 ). For each projection Pi and for each Hy ∈ Ni, we record the value of
We note that since we make m|Ni| queries in total, these queries preserve α-differential privacy.
Taking a union bound over the halfspaces in each Ni, we find that the probability δ2 that any of the v i y differ from Hy(Pi(D)) by more than 2 is at most
Solving for n, we find that
" log(1/δ2) + log log 1/δ1 + log bd + log(1/ 1 )
To respond to a query Hy, for each projection Pi we first compute
We recall that by construction, d(P (y), y i ) ≤ (3/4)γ. We then return the median value from the set {v PROOF. Above, we set the value of m such that for any halfspace query Hy, with probability at most δ1, no more than an 1 fraction of the points have the property that they are outside of a γ margin of Hy but yet their projections are within a (3/4)γ margin of H P i (y) , where i is the index of the median projection. Therefore, answering a query H y , where y is (3/4)γ-close to Pi(y), only introduces 1 error. Moreover, we have chosen n such that except with probability δ2, the privacy-preserving queries introduce no more than an additional 2 error. The theorem follows by setting 1 = 2 = /2 and δ1 = δ2 = δ/2, and setting n, m, and k as above.
DISTRIBUTIONAL PRIVACY
We say that an interactive database mechanism A satisfies (α, β)-distributional privacy if for any distribution over database elements D, with probability 1 − β, two databases D1 and D2 consisting of n elements drawn without replacement from D, for any query Q and output x satisfies
Similarly, for non-interactive mechanisms, a mechanism A satisfies (α, β)-distributional privacy if for any distribution over database elements D, with probability 1 − β, two databases D1 and D2 consisting of n elements drawn without replacement from D, and for all sanitized outputs b D,
For example, suppose that a collection of hospitals in a region each treats a random sample of patients with disease X. Distributional privacy means that a hospital can release its data anonymously, without necessarily revealing which hospital the data came from. Actually, our main motivation is that this definition is particularly natural from the perspective of learning theory: given a sample of points drawn from some distribution D, one would like to reveal no more information about the sample than is inherent in D itself. We will typically think of β as being exponentially small, whereas α must be Ω(1/n) for A to be useful.
Relationship Between Definitions
It is not a priori clear whether either differential privacy or distributional privacy is a stronger notion than the other, or if the two are equivalent, or distinct. On the one hand, differential privacy only provides a guarantee when D1 and D2 differ in a single element,THEOREM 7.1. If A satisfies (α, β) 
Therefore, A satisfies α-differential privacy. DEFINITION 7.2. Define the mirrored mod m function as follows:
n , define the query
Note that the global sensitivity of any query Qm satisfies GSQ m ≤ 1/n. Therefore, the mechanism A that answers queries Qn by A(D, Qm) = Qm(D)+Z where Z is drawn from Lap(1/(αn)) = Lap(GSQ m /α) satisfies α-differential privacy, which follows from the results of Dwork et al. [9] . 
PROOF. Consider databases with elements drawn from D = {0, 1}
n and the query Q 2/α . As observed above, a mechanism A such that A(D, Qi) = Qi(D) + Z for Z ∼ Lap(1/(αn)) has α-differential privacy for any i. Note however that with constant probability, two databases D1, D2 drawn from D have |Q 2/α (D1) − Q 2/α (D2)| ≥ 1/(αn). Therefore, for any output x, we have that with constant probability,
Although there are simpler functions for which preserving distributional privacy requires more added noise than preserving differential privacy, the mirrored-mod function above is an example of a function for which it is possible to preserve differential privacy usefully, but yet impossible to reveal any useful information while preserving distributional privacy.
We note that in order for distributional privacy to imply differential privacy, it is important that in the definition of distributional privacy, database elements are drawn from some distribution D without replacement. Otherwise, for any non-trivial distribution, there is some database D * that is drawn with probability at most 1/2 n , and we may modify any distributional-privacy preserving mechanism A such that for every query Q, A(D * , Q) = D * , and for any Di = D * , A(Di, Q) behaves as before. Since this new behavior occurs with probability ≤ β over draws from D for β = O(1/2 n ), A still preserves distributional privacy, but no longer preserves differential privacy (which requires that the privacy guarantee hold for every pair of neighboring databases).
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this work, we view the problem of database privacy through the lens of learning theory. This suggests both a new definition of privacy, distributional privacy (which we show is strictly stronger than differential privacy), and the idea that we can study usefulness relative to particular classes of functions. Restricting our notion of usefulness to particular classes of functions allows us to circumvent the lower bounds of [6, 9, 10] which show that non-interactive privacy preserving database access mechanisms can not in general be as useful as interactive mechanisms. In fact, we are able to show that it is possible to release privacy-preserving databases that are useful for all queries over a discretized domain in a concept class with polynomial VC-dimension. We show that this discretization is necessary by proving that it is impossible to privately release a database that is useful for halfspace queries without relaxing our definition of usefulness, but we demonstrate an algorithm that does so efficiently under a small relaxation of this definition.
This work demonstrates that the existing very strong lower bounds for useful, privacy-preserving, non-interactive mechanisms are not insurmountable, but can be circumvented by a number of reasonable relaxations to the standard definitions. However, our paper leaves a number of important questions open. Prime among them is the question of efficient private data release-we have shown that information theoretically it is possible to release a database that is useful for any concept class with polynomial VC-dimension (under our original, strong definition of usefulness) while preserving differential privacy, but we know how to do this efficiently only for the simplest classes of functions. Is it possible to efficiently privately and usefully release a database for every concept class with polynomial VC-Dimension? Is it possible for the class of conjunctions? For the class of parity functions?
One approach to efficient database release is to efficiently sample from the distribution defined by the exponential mechanism in Theorem 3.1. In order to do so, it might be necessary to relax our quality function, since even computing the quality function on a particular input/output database pair is as hard as agnostically learning, over arbitrary distributions, the concept class for which we want to guarantee usefulness. (To see this, consider labeling the points in the input database as positive examples and those in the output database as negative.) Additionally, we note that the ability to agnostically learn a concept class is not by itself enough to efficiently sample from the desired distribution; one approach to sampling is to design a random Markov process that converges quickly to the desired stationary distribution.
